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the most common type of occupational fraud. This motivated the current study 
to examine areas related to asset misappropriation that had never been 
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Needless to say how costly fraud could be to any organisation. In fact, fraud cost is far 
beyond just financial losses because it can also result in high turnover, loss of 
productivity, increased fear of insecurity, and loss of confidence in the capital market and 
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audit profession. This makes fraud a major concern for investors, regulators, and external 
auditors. 
There are many classifications for fraud but the current study and most prior literature 
broadly classifies fraud as either external fraud or internal fraud. External fraud is 
committed by individuals outside the organisation such as credit card fraud, investment 
fraud, customer’s fraud, and vendor’s fraud. In contrast, internal fraud is committed by 
employees of the company and is commonly known as either ‘occupational fraud’ or 
‘corporate fraud’ (Johnson and Rudesill, 2001; O’Gara, 2004; Alleyne and Howard, 
2005; Wells, 2005). Occupational fraud was defined by the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners [ACFE, (2002), p.4] as: “The use of one’s occupation for personal 
enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing 
organisation’s resources or assets”. Examples and categories of internal fraud include 
asset misappropriation, financial reporting fraud, and corruption (Wells, 1995). 
The current study is more concerned about internal or occupational fraud, and more 
specifically asset misappropriation for several reasons. First, occupational fraud is the 
most common and costly type of fraud and occurs more frequently than external fraud 
(ACFE, 2010, 2012; PWC, 2010; Hassink, et al., 2010; Wells, 2005). Second, although 
asset misappropriation is the most common type of occupational fraud (ACFE, 2010), it 
was given the least attention in prior literature and no attention in Egypt. In addition, 
none of these few studies mentioned how external auditors could detect asset 
misappropriation or how they could properly respond to fraud risk factors arising from 
asset misappropriation. Third, although current professional audit standards [International 
Standards on Auditing No. 240 (ISA No. 240): “the auditor’s responsibilities relating to 
fraud in an audit of financial statements”] expanded external auditors’ responsibility for 
fraud detection, critics (Pedneault, 2004; Smith and Baharuddin, 2005; Zimbelman, 1997; 
Glover et al., 2003; Zikmund, 2008; Brazel et al., 2010; Mcdonald and Banks, 1997; 
Hogan et al., 2008; Srivastava et al., 2009; Shelton et al., 2001) argued that the standard 
provides little guidance to external auditors on fraud risk response with respect to asset 
misappropriation and financial reporting fraud. They also argued that ISA No. 240 did 
not assign weights for red flags, making external auditors assume that fraud risk factors 
are equally important. This could lead to an inefficient, ineffective, and inconsistent 
application of fraud risk assessment and fraud risk response. 
The case of Egypt was of particular interest to the current study due to the scarcity of 
research about fraud in general and the lack of research studies into asset 
misappropriation in particular in the Egyptian context. Dahawy et al. (2010), and Hassan 
and Power (2009) argued that Egypt is characterised by the secrecy culture and 
management tend to view information as a private asset owned by the firm. This indicates 
that fraud news is less likely to be publicly available given the secretive culture that 
characterises Egypt. In the meantime, external auditors in Egypt are required to follow 
ISA No. 240. However, there is no evidence that this standard is actually implemented in 
Egypt, to what extent external auditors in Egypt are aware of fraud risk factors, and how 
they are more likely to respond to fraud risks arising from fraud. This motivated the 
current study to expand researchers and external auditors’ knowledge about a type of 
occupational fraud that has been rarely investigated and to examine areas related to asset 
misappropriation (fraud risk assessment and fraud risk response) which have never been 
examined before in prior literature and the Egyptian context. The current study also 
provides external auditors with a framework that might help them properly assess and 
respond to risk factors arising from asset misappropriation. Although this framework was 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Detecting asset misappropriation 3    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
based on perceptions of external auditors in Egypt, it can still be used by external auditors 
in any other country because the list of red flags proposed by the current study was 
derived from examples of fraud risk factors provided by audit professional standards 
(SAS No.99, ISA No. 240), and Wells 2005 textbook Principles of Fraud Examination 
which was based on real fraud cases that took place in different countries. Thus, the 
current study contributes to both knowledge and practice. To achieve the study’s aims, 
mixed research methods were used (questionnaire and a semi-structured interview) to 
collect data from the study sample (external auditors in Egypt). 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 defines, explains, and 
illustrates the different categories of asset misappropriation, and how each can be 
committed and concealed. Section 3 critically reviews prior research studies into asset 
misappropriation, highlights the gaps in the literature and presents the research main 
questions. Section 4 describes the methods used for data collection. Section 5 shows the 
main findings and data analysis. Section 6 presents and explains the proposed framework 
for detecting asset misappropriation. Section 7 draws the conclusion and provides 
insights for future research. 
2 The nature and categories of asset misappropriation 
Asset misappropriation involves stealing an asset of a company for personal use at the 
company’s expense or misuse of a company’s resources. Asset misappropriation is often 
accompanied by false or misleading records or documents to conceal the theft (Johnson 
and Rudesill, 2001; Wells, 2005; KPMG, 2006, 2007; Soltani, 2007; Lasko, 2009; Bayley 
and Eliff, 2009; ACFE, 2010). Thus, the definition of asset misappropriation is broader 
than simple theft as it also includes abuse of assets (Majid et al., 2010). Asset 
misappropriation is usually perpetrated by employees in relatively small and immaterial 
amounts. However, it can also involve management, who are usually more able to 
disguise or conceal misappropriations in ways that are difficult to detect (Soltani, 2007; 
Elder et al., 2010; Jones, 2011). According to ACFE (2010, 2012), asset misappropriation 
is the most common form of fraud representing 90% of the fraud cases investigated in 
their study. However, it was the least costly type of fraud, causing a median loss of 
$135,000. The ACFE study in 2010 was a global fraud study that involves many 
countries across the globe including Egypt, though there were only five fraud cases 
reported in Egypt. However, in the ACFE 2012 report, no fraud cases were reported from 
Egypt. This might again be justified by the secrecy culture in a developing country like 
Egypt where fraud news and fraud research are less likely to be publicly available. This 
further motivated the current study to explore a type of fraud that has never been 
researched before in the Egyptian context. Consistently, KPMG (2006, 2007) and PWC 
(2011) found that asset misappropriation is the most common type of occupational fraud. 
In a study conducted by Wells in 1995, where he examined 2,608 cases of actual 
fraud provided by Certified Fraud Examiners, many of which occurred in the UK, results 
revealed that occupational fraud is classified into three main categories (asset 
misappropriation, financial reporting fraud, and corruption) and each of these categories 
is classified into further sub-categories, regardless of the international borders. Asset 
misappropriation was thus classified into three further sub-categories: skimming 
schemes, cash larceny, and fraudulent disbursements schemes. Figure 1 illustrates the 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   4 R. Kassem    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
different sub-categories of asset misappropriation. This classification is commonly used 
by many practitioners and researchers as well such as the ACFE in its Reports to the 
Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse which was published in 2002, 2004, 2006, 
2008, 2010 and recently 2012, KPMG in a study about occupational fraud in  
New Zealand in 2006 and 2007 in the Middle East region, and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC) in a study conducted in 2011 into asset misappropriation. 
Figure 1 Categories of asset misappropriation (see online version for colours) 
 
Source: ACFE (2010, p.1) 
As shown in Figure 1, the first sub-category of asset misappropriation is called 
‘skimming’. This type is very difficult to detect, investigate, and proof because it takes 
place before money is recorded in a company’s accounting system leaving no audit trail. 
That is why it is called an off-book scheme. Skimming can be committed in numerous 
ways and detecting and preventing them varies from industry to industry. However, 
regardless of the industry, it is important to develop surprise audit procedures that would 
detect a skimming scheme (ACFE, 2010). Coenen (2009) argued that since skimming is 
so difficult to detect and prove companies should rely heavily on preventive controls that 
would make employees reluctant to steal. According to the ACFE 2010 report, skimming 
caused a median loss of $60,000 and the percentage of skimming cases account for about 
14.5% of all reported fraud cases worldwide. The report also showed that skimming 
schemes are more prevalent in small sized organisations (with less than 100 employees) 
and was found to be prevalent in banking/financial services sectors followed by 
healthcare, public administration and manufacturing sectors. 
Skimming happens at the point of entry of money into a business, and usually occurs 
in small, cash intensive business. Typical jobs that might involve access to funds in this 
way include bank teller, waitress, store cashier, salesperson, or medical billing clerk 
(Zweighaft, 2004; Wells, 2005; Silverstone and Sheetz, 2007; Hopwood et al., 2008; 
Coenen, 2009; ACFE, 2010). There are two types of skimming schemes: 
1 sales skimming 
2 receivables skimming. 
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Sales skimming are especially common when the fraudster has access to incoming funds 
from an unusual source, such as refunds that have not been accounted for by the victim 
organisation. While, receivables skimming are more difficult to conceal than sales 
skimming because incoming receivables payments are expected, so the victim 
organisation is likely to notice if these payments are not received and entered into the 
accounting system (Wells, 2005; Buckhoff, 2006; Coenen, 2008). Sales skimming can be 
conducted during non-business hours without the knowledge of the owners, where the 
fraudster can pocket the money for personal use (Wells, 2005; Buckhoff, 2006). Other 
ways for committing this scheme is stealing unrecorded cheques and substituting them 
for cash or understating sales by either reducing the item price or recording the sale of 
fewer items and stealing the excess receipts (Wells, 2005; Coenen, 2009). On the other 
hand, receivables skimming can be committed by lapping customer accounts (Wells, 
2005; Buckhoff, 2006; Coenen, 2009) or by stealing, destroying, or altering the account 
statements by changing the customer’s address in the billing system causing the 
statements to return back to the fraudster’s desk (Wells, 2005; Hopwood et al., 2008; 
Coenen, 2009). 
In contrast cash larceny, which is the second sub-category of asset misappropriation, 
involves the theft of funds that are already recorded in a company’s accounting system. 
Thus, cash larceny is called an on-book scheme (Wells, 2005; Silverstone and Sheetz, 
2007; Coenen, 2009; ACFE, 2010). In cash larceny because the funds have already been 
recorded somewhere in the company’s accounting system, action must be taken to 
conceal the theft. This might include something like entering a false refund into the cash 
register, voiding a transaction, or booking an adjustment in the accounting records. Most 
larceny schemes involve the theft of cash at the following situations: At the point of sale, 
from incoming receivables or from the victim company’s bank deposit (Wells, 2005; 
Coenen, 2009). According to the 2010 ACFE report, the median loss caused by cash 
larceny was $100,000 and the percentage of reported cash larceny cases were about 9.8% 
of the total reported fraud cases worldwide. The report also showed that cash larceny 
schemes are more prevalent in small sized firms and in the banking/financial services 
sector. Cash larceny at the point of sale can be committed and concealed by many ways, 
such as: stealing by using someone else’s access code (Wells, 2005; Buckhoff, 2006), 
stealing currency in very small amounts over an extended period of time so that theft can 
be credited to errors rather than fraud (Wells, 2005 and Coenen, 2009), altering the cash 
counts to make the cash on hand and the tape balance or by simply destroying the register 
tape (Wells, 2005; Buckhoff, 2006; and Coenen, 2009). It can also be committed by 
making false voids or refunds which cause the register tape to reconcile to the amount of 
cash on hand after theft (Wells, 2005; Buckhoff, 2006; Hopwood et al., 2008; Coenen, 
2009). However, larceny from receivables can be committed by reversing entries to 
balance the victim company’s accounts or destroying records to conceal the identity of 
the thief. As for larceny from deposits, this can be committed by stealing cash from the 
deposit on the way to the bank and altering the deposit slip so that it reflects a lesser 
amount. This can be concealed by deposit lapping or carrying the missing money as 
deposits in transit which will appear on the next month’s bank statement (Wells, 2005; 
Buckhoff, 2006; Coenen, 2009). 
The third sub-category of asset misappropriation is called ‘fraudulent disbursement’. 
In this scheme, the perpetrator causes his/her organisation to disburse funds through some 
tricks or devices (Wells, 2005; Buckhoff, 2006; Silverstone and Sheetz, 2007; ACFE, 
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2010). Figure 1 shows that fraudulent disbursement has further five sub-categories: 
billing schemes, cheque tampering schemes, payroll schemes, expense reimbursement 
schemes, and register disbursement schemes. 
Billing scheme is any scheme in which a person causes his employer to issue a 
payment by submitting invoices for fictitious goods or services or goods with inferior 
quality, inflated invoices, or invoices for personal purchases (Wells, 2005; Buckhoff, 
2006; Silverstone and Sheetz, 2007; ACFE, 2010). Results from the 2010 ACFE’s Report 
to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, showed the median loss caused by 
billing schemes is $128,000 and billing scheme cases accounted for 26% of the total 
reported fraud cases worldwide. The report also showed billing scheme cases occurred 
more in small sized firms rather than large sized ones and it tended to occur more in the 
manufacturing sector, followed by government and public administration sector. Billing 
scheme can be committed by creating shell companies, which is basically a fake 
company, that issue invoices to the victim company for products or services never 
delivered or provided (Silverstone and Sheetz, 2007; Vona, 2008; Coenen, 2009). The 
shell company can also inserts an intermediary into a company’s transaction in order to 
overcharge the company and keep the profits. This can be concealed through fictitious 
authorisation (Wells, 2005; Coenen, 2009). Other ways for committing and concealing 
billing schemes include; altering the invoice of a legitimate vendor to cause the company 
to pay more than is really owed and getting the excess money by contacting the vendor 
and explaining a mistake has happened so that the fraudster could take the money for his 
personal use (Silverstone and Sheetz, 2007; Coenen, 2009), or this could happen in 
collusion with the vendor (Vona, 2008). Billing schemes can also be committed by 
making fictitious purchases by submitting a false invoice or approval, or by collusion 
with a real company, or by purchasing fictitious services rather than goods such as 
consulting services which is difficult to be traced (Wells, 2005; Buckhoff, 2006; Vona, 
2008; Daigle et al., 2009). 
The second sub-category of fraudulent disbursements is called Cheque tampering and 
it can be defined as any scheme in which a person steals his employer’s funds by 
intercepting, forging, stealing, or altering a cheque drawn on one of the organisation’s 
bank accounts (Wells, 2005; Vona, 2008; Coenen, 2009; ACFE, 2010). Although online 
banking, money transfers, and debit/credit cards are more commonly used nowadays in 
most countries including Egypt, cheques are still used by companies as a method of 
payment. The ACFE (2010) reported a median loss from cheque tampering of about 
$131000. The report also showed that cheque tampering is more prevalent in 
banking/financial services sector and that it is more likely to occur in small businesses. 
This can be committed if an authorised employee with the proper authority signs cheques 
for her/his personal use, by forging the signature of the person authorised to sign cheques, 
intercepting a cheque by signing the endorsement line, forging the company’s name on 
the endorsement line, stealing and altering the payee name by using erasable ink in the 
initial preparation of the cheques with the intent to alter it after management’s approval, 
or getting management to sign a blank cheques (Wells, 2005; Vona, 2008). 
The third sub-category of fraudulent disbursements is payroll scheme. In this scheme, 
an employee causes his employer to issue a payment by making false claims for 
compensation (Wells, 2005; Silverstone and Sheetz, 2007; ACFE, 2010). As reported by 
the ACFE (2010), the median loss caused by payroll scheme was about $72,000. The 
report showed that cases from payroll scheme account for 8.5% of total reported fraud 
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cases worldwide. The report also showed that payroll scheme is more likely to occur in 
small businesses and in the manufacturing and public administration sectors alike. 
Payroll fraud in case of hourly paid salaries can be committed if sales personnel 
misstate the sales amount to get more commission than what they deserve (Wells, 2005; 
Coenen, 2009), or by adding a fictitious person or failing to remove the name of a retired 
employee who used to work for the company which is called a ghost employee (Wells, 
2005; Buckhoff, 2006; Silverstone and Sheetz, 2007; Coenen, 2008, 2009; Vona, 2008). 
It can also be committed by forging the necessary approval and then forwarding the 
forged timecard directly to payroll accounting by passing his/her supervisor (Wells, 2008; 
Coenen, 2009), or colluding to misstate the hours worked or altering time cards after 
being properly approved (Vona, 2008). Salaried employees can commit payroll fraud by 
generating fraudulent wages via increasing their rates of pay and forging their 
supervisor’s approval, or by simply colluding with their supervisor, or recording fictitious 
year-end sales (Wells, 2005; Buckhoff, 2006; Vona, 2008; Coenen, 2009). In case of 
sales personnel whose salary depends on the amount of sales made, payroll fraud can be 
committed and concealed by changing quotes to get bonuses, falsifying the amount of 
sales by creating fictitious sales, recording a higher price in the company book than what 
was actually charged to a customer, increasing the rate of commission, or changing the 
prices listed on sales documents (Wells, 2005; Coenen, 2009). Other methods include; 
selling sales promotional items or causing sales to be recorded early (Vona, 2008). 
However in expense reimbursement schemes, which are the fourth sub-category of 
fraudulent disbursements schemes, an employee makes a claim for reimbursement of 
fictitious or inflated business expenses (Wells, 2005; Buckhoff 2006; Coenen, 2009; 
ACFE, 2010). Median loss caused by expense reimbursement fraud scheme, as reported 
by the ACFE (2010), is $33,000. The report also showed that expense reimbursement 
scheme accounts for 15% of all reported fraud cases and it was more likely to occur in 
small businesses and more prevalent in the manufacturing sector. It can be committed by 
claiming items that do not qualify under the company’s reimbursement policy, and 
concealing the true nature of the expenses to ensure they are approved, reporting multiple 
expenses just below the threshold requiring receipts, creating fake expense items to 
generate a cash reimbursement, altering receipts using a correction fluid, or obtaining 
blank receipts from vendors. Other ways include charging something on the  
company-paid credit card, and then submitting the receipt separately to obtain a cash 
reimbursement, duplicating receipt for a meal and submitting that one after the original 
receipt was already reimbursed, or expensing personal items as if they were business 
expenses such as expensing personal vacations as business trips (Wells, 2005; Coenen, 
2009). 
The last sub-category of asset misappropriation is cash register disbursement scheme 
which can be defined as any scheme in which an employee makes false entries on a cash 
register to conceal the fraudulent removal of cash. It can be committed through either 
false voids or refunds (Wells, 2005; Buckhoff, 2006; Coenen, 2009). Results from the 
ACFE 2010 ‘Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse’ showed that cash 
register disbursement caused a median loss of about $23,000 and that it is more prevalent 
in the retail sector followed by banking services sector. Reported register disbursement 
fraud cases account for 3% of total reported fraud cases worldwide. Results also showed 
that this scheme is more likely to be committed in small and large sized firms equally and 
that it is not only the least costly form of fraud, but also tended to be detected the soonest. 
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Register disbursement can be committed and concealed by making fictitious refunds or 
overstating refunds, or making false voids in the cash register. This can be concealed by 
destroying records to prevent management from determining the identity of the thief and 
cover up money missing from the drawer (Wells, 2005; Coenen, 2009). 
3 Literature review and research questions 
Reviewing the literature showed very few research studies into asset misappropriation, 
however, none of them mentioned how external auditors might detect asset 
misappropriation. For instance, Chapple et al. (2007) examined the relation between the 
occurrence of asset misappropriation and the strength of firm’s corporate governance in 
Australia and their findings revealed that the likelihood of asset misappropriation 
increase when the Chief Executive Officers (CEO) also holds the position of chairperson 
of the board of directors. They also found that the greater the number of independent 
directors on the audit committee, the lower the level of fraud. Their results indicate that 
employing good corporate governance reduces the risk of the asset misappropriation. 
Consistently, Mustafa and Youssef (2010) investigated the relationship between the 
financial expertise of the audit committee and the incidence of asset misappropriation in 
publicly held companies using a sample of 28 publicly held companies in the USA who 
were experiencing asset misappropriation from 1987 to 1998, as well as 28 control 
companies matched according to size, industry, and time period. Results revealed that the 
higher the percentage of financial expert members and the higher the percentage of 
independent members in the audit committee, the lower the likelihood of asset 
misappropriation. However, both studies did not examine how asset misappropriation can 
be detected or the role of external audit in detecting asset misappropriation as a corporate 
governance mechanism. 
In another study, Coram et al. (2008) examined whether organisations with an 
internal audit function are more likely to detect and self-report asset misappropriation 
than those without. Their study depended on fraud data from the 2004 KPMG fraud 
survey which reported fraud from 491 organisations in the private and public sectors 
across Australia and New Zealand. Results revealed that companies who have an in-
house internal audit department are more likely to detect asset misappropriation than 
those who outsource the internal audit function. However, again they did not mention 
how asset misappropriation might be detected. In addition, their research has the 
following limitations. First, having internal audit might not be the only reason for less 
asset misappropriation because having internal audit might be associated with good 
governance and internal controls which might increase the propensity to detect and  
self-report asset misappropriation. Second, they argue that better controls including 
internal audit will be associated with a greater propensity to detect and self-report fraud, 
however it is possible that better controls will be associated with a greater propensity to 
prevent fraud, causing less overall detected and self-reported fraud. Majid et al. (2010) 
conducted a study in Malaysia to explore the opinions of local authority employees on the 
issue of asset misappropriation. Their findings revealed that the most likely assets to be 
misused in a local authority are vehicles and internet connection. They also found factors 
that might lead to asset misappropriation include inadequate or lack of internal control, 
lack of employee’s fraud education, lack of independent cheques, override of existing 
controls, and lack of management reviews, attitude, and lack of awareness of the 
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dishonest acts. Besides, the majority of respondents in their study believed the likelihood 
of asset misappropriation in the future is increasing. However, their research was based 
on the perception of employees in local authorities, did not show the types of asset 
misappropriation or how to detect any, and did not mention the role of external auditors 
in detecting this fraud scheme. Another limitation in their study is that it was conducted 
on just one local authority which makes it difficult for their results to be generalised. 
Only one study by Gullkvist and Jokipii (2012) examined whether internal auditors, 
external auditors, and economic crime investigators perceive the importance of red flags 
as significantly different across asset misappropriation and fraudulent financial reporting, 
as well as across within-subject categories. 471web-based surveys were collected from 
471 internal auditors, external auditors, and economic crime investigators. 
Findings revealed that significant differences in perceptions exist among the 
participant groups. Internal auditors report a higher perceived importance of red flags 
related to detecting asset misappropriation than those related to fraudulent financial 
reporting, whereas the economic crime investigators perceived red flags for fraudulent 
financial reporting as more important than that of asset misappropriation. External 
auditors reported equal perceived importance of red flags across the two fraud types as 
well as across within-subject categories. They provided a list of red flags for asset 
misappropriation and fraudulent financial reporting. However, they did not suggest 
weights to red flags in their list and did not mention how external auditors might respond 
to these red flags. Another weakness is the low response rate which affects the 
generalisation of the study results. 
Reviewing the literature also showed no prior studies into asset misappropriation in 
the Egyptian context. In addition, critics of fraud professional audit standards (Casabona, 
and Grego, 2003; Hoffman and Zimbelman, 2009; Wells, 2004) argued that audit 
professional standards did not mention how external auditors can decide on the quality or 
weights of red flags for fraud which leads to ineffective and inefficient fraud risk 
assessments. Others (Pedneault, 2004; Smith and Baharuddin, 2005; Zimbelman, 1997; 
Glover et al., 2003; Zikmund, 2008; Brazel et al., 2010; McDonald and Banks, 1997; 
Hogan et al., 2008; Srivastava et al., 2009; Shelton et al., 2001) mentioned that the 
standards omitted specific guidance for responding to fraud once the fraud risk factors are 
identified and did not require all procedures to be followed but merely suggested that 
auditors consider implementing them which might lead to inconsistencies in applying 
fraud-related audit procedures. 
In the mean time, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB, 2007) 
issued a report in 2007 to determine external auditors’ overall approach to the detection 
of financial fraud and response to fraud risk factors. Results revealed that in some 
situations, auditors fail to respond appropriately to fraud risk factors. Consistently, 
Hassink et al. (2010) and Hamersley et al. (2011) examined audit seniors’ responses to 
fraud risk factors as a way of providing evidence about the effectiveness and efficiency of 
external auditors’ fraud risk assessments and responses. Findings revealed that external 
auditors do not respond in an effective and appropriate way to heightened fraud risk. 
Dezoort and Harrison (2007) conducted an experimental study with 230 auditors from 
two Big 4 audit firms to evaluate whether auditors perceive different responsibility for 
detecting the three types of occupational fraud (fraudulent financial reporting, 
misappropriation of assets, and corruption). Findings revealed that external auditors give 
more recognition to financial reporting fraud than the other two types of fraud. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   10 R. Kassem    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Consistently, Kassem and Higson (2012) reviewed academic research studies to explore 
the reasons behind the audit expectation gap, and to assess the efforts of standards’ setters 
and external auditors in narrowing the gap and detecting fraud. The results of the review 
showed that the gap is still there due to limitations in the professional audit standards and 
because external auditors may not be exerting enough efforts to detect material 
misstatements arising from fraud. They explained that external auditors still need 
guidance on how to rank risk factors while considering the likelihood of fraud to the 
business, impact of the fraud if it occurs, and pervasiveness of the fraud if found. They 
added that the standards also provide very little guidance for external auditors on how to 
respond to heightened fraud risk factors which may lead to an ineffective fraud risk 
response and did not require all procedures to be followed but merely suggested that 
auditors consider implementing them which leads to inconsistency in the audit 
procedures used by different audit firms in response to these fraud risk factors. They also 
found that some external auditors still do not increase the extent of audit procedures or 
even change the nature of audit procedures in response to fraud risk assessments, 
inconsistently respond to identified fraud risk factors, do not modify the nature of their 
audit plans to make planned procedures more effective at detecting fraud in response to 
fraud risk as required by the standards, do not use professional scepticism, do not hold or 
document brainstorming sessions, and give more attention to fraudulent financial 
reporting than the other two types of fraud (asset misappropriation and corruption). This 
indicates external auditors need more fraud training and awareness as well as guidance on 
how to assess and respond to heightened fraud risk factors. 
Thus, the scarcity of prior studies into asset misappropriation, the limitations in fraud 
professional audit standards especially when it comes to guidance for external auditors on 
fraud risk assessment and response, along with the lack of fraud research in the Egyptian 
context motivated the current study to explore asset misappropriation and provide 
external auditors with a tool that might help them detect material misstatements arising 
from asset misappropriation. The tool suggested by the current study is a framework that 
includes a list of red flags of asset misappropriation ranked according to their relative 
importance along with suggested audit procedures that might help external auditors 
properly assess and respond to material misstatement arising from asset misappropriation. 
Thus, the proposed framework is divided into two parts, the first part lists the most 
important fraud risk factors associated with each category of asset misappropriation and 
the second part includes audit procedures that can be used by external auditors in 
response to each fraud risk factor. 
To develop the first part of the framework (list of the most important risk factors) the 
current study sought to answer the following two questions: 
Q1 Do external auditors perceive red flags as an effective tool in detecting material 
misstatements arising from asset misappropriation? 
Q2 Do external auditors perceive red flags across and within asset misappropriation 
categories equally important? 
To develop the second part of the proposed framework, the current study sought to 
determine how external auditors in Egypt might respond to the heightened fraud risk 
factors arising from asset misappropriation. Thus, the third research question is: 
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Q3 How might external auditors in Egypt respond to fraud risk factors arising from asset 
misappropriation? 
4 Research methods 
The current study generally aims at expanding external auditors’ knowledge of the nature 
and categories of asset misappropriation as well as providing them with a framework that 
might help them properly assess and respond to risk factors arising from asset 
misappropriation. The proposed framework was developed in three stages as explained 
below. 
4.1 1st stage – developing the initial list of red flags 
The first stage in developing the framework involved building an initial list of red flags 
arising from asset misappropriation. This list was initially built using examples of fraud 
risk factors provided by SAS No. 99, ISA No. 240 and Wells (2005) text book: Principles 
of Fraud Examination. This yields a list of 70 red flags for all types of asset 
misappropriation. The list was further refined by 15 external audit managers working in 
an international audit office in Egypt, reducing the total number of red flags to 52. The 
criteria used to refine the list of red flags include removing any duplication of red flags to 
avoid redundancy and merging some red flags for simplification. One example is false 
voids and false refunds which are related to register disbursements schemes. Another 
example is forged, missing, or altered refund documents in case of skimming schemes 
(see Table 1). The rationale behind that was to increase the response rate by reducing the 
list of red flags so respondents will not be bored to think and answer questions related to 
red flags. This list was then used as a base for the questionnaire which sought external 
auditors’ perception on the importance of red flags arising from asset misappropriation. 
4.2 2nd stage – importance of red flags across and within asset 
misappropriation categories – questionnaire 
In order to get the perception of external auditors on the relative importance of red flags 
across and within asset misappropriation categories, a questionnaire was used. This 
questionnaire was based on the list of red flags developed in the first stage, and aimed at 
answering the first and second research questions (whether red flags are effective in 
detecting asset misappropriation and whether red flags across and within asset 
misappropriation categories are equally important). The questionnaire was pilot-tested by 
15 audit managers working in one of the leading international audit firms in Egypt, and 
then refined in accordance with the feedback received from the pilot study. The 
modifications required were mainly about rephrasing some of the questions to make it 
easily understandable by respondents and also included a change in the layout of the 
questionnaire to make it more attractive for respondents but no change was required in 
the number and style of questions. 
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Table 1 List of red flags for asset misappropriation 
Red flag for skimming schemes 
High levels of discounts, adjustments, returns, and write offs. 
Similarities between the customers’ addresses, ID numbers, or tax numbers and those of 
employees especially those working in the accounts receivable department. 
Currency or cheques detail on summary sheets did not reconcile to the deposit ticket. 
Flat or declining revenue, ratio of cash sales to credit sales or to total sales decreasing. 
Forged, missing or altered refund documents. 
Cash sales or receipts differing from deposits on bank statements. 
Cash deposits totals differing from normal or expected patterns, or missing deposit slips, sales 
invoices or increased use of petty cash fund. 
Unusual journal entries or reconciling items. 
Customers with no telephone numbers or tax ID number may have been created for use in 
posting improper entries to hide a skimming scheme. 
A significant rise in the number or size of overdue accounts could be a result of an employee 
who steals customer payments without ever posting them, thus causing the accounts to be past 
due. 
Personal cheques included in cash funds (swapping cheques for cash). 
Red flags for cash larceny 
If sales records have been destroyed, this could be a sign of larceny schemes. 
Discrepancies between sales records and cash on hand. Large differences will normally draw 
attention but also be alert to a high frequency of small dollar occurrences because fraudsters 
sometimes steal small amounts in the hopes that they will not be noticed or that they will be too 
small to review. 
The totals in bank deposit slip, the organisation’s copy of the deposit slip, the remittance list, 
and the general ledger posting of the day’s receipts did not match. 
Any instance in which a deposit in transit exceeds the two day clear. 
All journal entries in cash accounts that appear to be unique adjustments. 
Red flags for billing schemes 
Unexplained increases in the quantity of goods purchased. 
Purchases that cannot be traced to inventory. 
Significant increases in average unit price of goods purchased could signal pass-through 
schemes. 
If there is a match between employee addresses and vendor addresses. 
The existence of unfamiliar vendors. 
Vendors with company names consisting only of initials can be a sign of fraud because in most 
fraud cases fraudsters use their first name initials to form a shell company. 
Internal control deficiency such as allowing a person who processes payments to approve new 
vendors. 
Large billings broken into multiple smaller invoices, each of which is for an amount that will 
not attract attention. 
The mailing address on an invoice if it is a mail drop or a residential address, it may indicate the 
existence of a shell company scheme. 
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Table 1 List of red flags for asset misappropriation (continued) 
Red flags for billing schemes 
Repeatedly billing for the same or similar amounts and if the perpetrator has purchase authority, 
these amounts will tend to be just below the perpetrator’s approval limit. 
An invoice that lacks detailed descriptions of the items for which the victim organisation is 
being billed. 
Billing schemes will cause an organisation’s expenses to exceed budget projections. 
Billing causes an increase in expenses from previous years. 
Billing schemes will also tend to cause an increase in cost of goods sold relative to sales and 
will tend to negatively impact profits. 
Rapidly increasing purchases from one vendor or vendor billing more than one month. 
Red flags for cheque tampering 
Any cancelled cheques with more than one endorsement should be investigated, as should any 
non-payroll cheques that an employee has endorsed. That is because; to convert intercepted 
cheques the perpetrator may have to use a dual endorsement. 
Cheques issued to cash have a higher incidence of fraud. 
Cheques that are fabricated or stolen will many times not be in the same general sequence as the 
company’s normal cheque sequence. 
Cheques that are stolen will normally not appear in the vendor cheque register and thus will be 
seen as a gap in the cheque sequence. 
In case of rotating the authorisation duty, if a cancelled cheques shows a signature from the 
wrong signer for the date of the disbursement, this could indicate fraud. 
Red flags for payroll schemes 
Ghost employees who have no physical address or phone number or who have the same social 
security number and bank account number on their files can be a red flag for fraud existence. 
Significant budget overruns could signal payroll fraud. 
The net payroll expense was lower than the funds actually issued because it did not include 
amounts paid to ghost employees. 
The pay cheque summaries prepared for management approval can have different type face 
from those the system printed. 
Red flags for expense reimbursement schemes 
Receipts from a restaurant that are submitted over an extended period of time, yet are 
consecutively numbered. This tends to indicate that the employee has obtained a stack of blank 
receipts and is using them to support fictitious expenses. 
Receipts or other support that do not looks professional or lack information about the vendor 
such as phone numbers, physical addresses, or logos. 
Employees claiming items that were paid for in cash. Claiming an expense was paid in cash 
allows the fraudster to explain why there is no audit trail for the expense. 
Using credit cards for low dollar amount expenses while using cash in higher dollar expenses 
High usage of credit cards by certain employees may be a sign of abuse. 
Expenses that are consistently rounded off, ending with a 0 or a 5 which tends to indicate that 
the employee is fabricating the numbers. 
Patterns in which expenses are consistently for the same amount. For instance; a salesperson’s 
business dinners always cost $120. 
Reimbursement requests from an employee that consistently fall at or just below the 
organisation’s reimbursement limit. 
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Table 1 List of red flags for asset misappropriation (continued) 
Red flags for register disbursement schemes 
Missing or forged void or refund document. 
Customer sales posted to one card and refunds posted to another card. 
Increased void or refund transactions by individual employees. 
Cashier’s ability to issue refund without supervision. 
The existence of some company’s branches with high adjustments. 
The questionnaire was then delivered by hand to one hundred external auditors working 
in different types of audit firms in Egypt (local, international, and Big 4 international). 
However, 93 questionnaires were received, which is still a very high response rate 
compared to other research studies. Purposive sampling was used to choose the study 
sample because it allows access to as wide a range of individuals relevant to the research 
questions as possible so that many different perspectives and ranges of activity are the 
focus of attention (Fisher, 2004; Bryman, 2012). Purposive sampling was also used for 
two reasons. The first reason is the difficulty that was faced in accessing the audit firms 
and offices in Egypt and in convincing external auditors to fill the questionnaire. Thus, to 
increase the response rate, personal contacts was used to reach the study respondents and 
to make sure they personally filled the questionnaire. The second reason pertains to 
highly technical questions that require respondents who have sufficient years of 
experience and qualifications. This was important to the current study because if 
respondents have insufficient knowledge or experience, they may deliberately guess at 
the answer, a tendency known as ‘uninformed response’ which reduces the reliability of 
data. 
The questionnaire was about eight pages including a cover letter which was addressed 
to the applicant. The cover letter includes the research purposes and importance, and a 
request of cooperation from the part of the applicants in completing the practical part of 
the research (see Appendix A2). It also includes a statement that ensures the 
confidentiality in using the responses of the applicants and that it will only be used for 
academic research purpose. The questionnaire was divided into three main sections. The 
first section was designed to answer the first research question (Do external auditors 
perceive red flags of asset misappropriation effective in detecting material misstatements 
arising from asset misappropriation?). Questions in this section are closed-ended 
questions and the nominal scale are used providing only two alternative answers that each 
respondent is requested to choose from (yes or no). Closed questions facilitate the 
processing of data because they are normally pre-coded, thus reducing coding errors and 
time (Bryman, 2012). They also enhance the comparability of answers, and reduce the 
possibility of variability in the recording of answers. The second section was designed to 
answer the second research question (Do external auditors perceive red flags across and 
within categories of asset misappropriation equally important?). Respondents in this 
section were asked to rank the list of red flags for each category of asset misappropriation 
on a scale from 1 to 5, where ‘1’ denotes the least important red flag and ‘5’ denotes the 
most important red flag. The third section includes questions about respondents 
demographic factors (years of experience and type of audit office) as well as a question 
seeking the permission of respondents to interview them later. This was used as a basis 
for choosing more participants for the interview in addition to personal contacts.  
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Tables 2 and 3 show the distribution of the study sample in terms of their audit years of 
experience and type of audit office. As shown in Table 2, out of 93 respondents, only  
88 respondents filled information about their years of audit experience, but all of them 
mentioned the type of their audit office as shown in Table 3. 
Table 2 Respondents’ years of audit experience 
Years of audit 
experience (0–2) years (3–5) years (6–10) years 
More than 10 years 
of experience 
Respondents 26 31 13 18 
Table 3 Respondents’ type of audit office 
Types of audit office Local International Big 4 
Respondents 16 75 2 
4.3 3rd stage – fraud risk response-interview 
The third stage in building the proposed framework was to get respondents’ views on the 
likely audit procedures that be used in response to red flags of asset misappropriation. In 
order to reach this step and answer the third research question (How external auditors 
could respond to heightened fraud risk factors?), an interview was conducted with  
20 external auditors (eight audit seniors and 12 audit managers) working in an 
international audit office in Egypt. To get the sample for the interview, snowballing was 
used. Thus, initially personal contacts was used to get access to that audit firm and to 
interview five external auditors in the population who have considerable years of audit 
experience to be able to answer highly technical questions about the audit procedures. 
These five respondents (all audit seniors) were further asked to identify other respondents 
who might be interested in being interviewed and who also have similar years of audit 
experience. This added up more ten respondents who were interested to be interviewed 
(three audit seniors and seven audit managers). Another five respondents from the 
questionnaire in the second stage showed interest to be interviewed and they were all 
audit managers. 
The interview was semi-structured interview, including predetermined set of 
questions (How would you likely respond to each of the below red flags of asset 
misappropriation?) but the answers were not predetermined in order to allow respondents 
to answer freely without restricting their thoughts to a number of choices. This better 
served the purpose of the research because the research aimed to get every possible audit 
procedure that experienced external auditors may use to respond to heightened fraud risk 
factors arising from asset misappropriation. 
Interviewees were given the refined list of red flags for asset misappropriation 
developed in stage two and they were asked to mention every possible audit procedure(s) 
they might use as a response to each red flag under each category of asset 
misappropriation. Interviewees were provided with a credible rationale for the research in 
which they are being asked to participate and for giving up their valuable time. An 
introductory statement was made to show the importance of the research and the kind of 
information to be collected and why they have been selected. Respondents were 
reassured that their identity will be anonymised and any information provided will be 
confidential. The interview was tape-recorded to ensure validity and reliability, and to 
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keep track of interviewees’ responses. Each interview took about 50 minutes. The results 
of the interview were then refined by removing similar audit procedures and adding every 
possible audit procedure in front of each heightened fraud risk factor. This yielded a 
framework of categories of asset misappropriation, red flags of each, and related audit 
procedures (see Section 6). To ensure credibility participants was given relevant 
information before the interview via e-mail. This enabled interviewees to consider the 
information being requested and allowed them the opportunity to assemble supporting 
organisational documentation from their files. 
5 Data analysis and research results 
5.1 Questionnaire 
Data collected from the questionnaire was analysed using SPSS. Frequency tables were 
used including the number of observations recorded for each separate question in each 
section and sub section as well as the percentages of responses to determine external 
auditors’ perception on the importance of red flags of asset misappropriation (see 
Appendix A1). The questionnaire was mainly used to test the first and second research 
questions. Below are the results of the analysis. 
5.1.1 1st research question 
The first research question was about whether external auditors perceive red flags as an 
effective tool in detecting asset misappropriation. To test respondents’ answers to the first 
question, descriptive statistics (frequency tables and median) were used. Results showed 
that 58% to 97% of respondents perceived that the suggested list of red flags of skimming 
schemes is important for detecting such fraud scheme. The median score for these red 
flags was 57%, which means 57% or more of these red flags were perceived important in 
detecting skimming schemes. 
As for red flags of cash larceny schemes, results showed that 72% to 98% of 
respondents perceived the suggested list of red flags of cash larceny important in 
detecting such fraud scheme. The median score showed that 62.4% or more of the 
suggested red flags for cash larceny were perceived important in detecting this type of 
fraud. 
On the other hand, results for the subcategories of fraudulent disbursement schemes 
showed that 58% to 97% of respondents believe the suggested red flags for billing 
schemes are important, with a median score of 57%. Results also showed that 60% to 
95% of respondents perceived red flags for cheque tampering important in its detection, 
with a median score of 69.9%. As for payroll schemes, 65% to 96% of respondents 
perceived red flags for this type as important in its detection (median = 66.7%). Red flags 
for expense reimbursement schemes got from 53% to 90% acceptance from respondents 
and a median score of 53.8%. Red flags of the last type of fraudulent disbursement 
schemes, register disbursements, got from 86% to 95% percentage of acceptance from 
respondents and a median score of 61.3%. The above results indicate that external 
auditors in Egypt perceive red flags as an effective tool in detecting material 
misstatements arising from asset misappropriation. This also shows that external auditors 
in Egypt are aware of the red flags associated with different categories of asset 
misappropriation. 
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5.1.2 2nd research question 
The second research question sought to determine whether external auditors perceive red 
flags across and within the different categories of asset misappropriation equally 
important. Data was analysed using SPSS and frequency tables were used. Analysis of 
the results revealed that external auditors did not perceive red flags of asset 
misappropriation equally important. This was inconsistent with results from Gullkvist 
and Jokipii (2012) who found equal perceptions of external auditors of the red flags for 
each subcategory in asset misappropriation. For instance, in skimming schemes, the most 
important red flags were: ‘forged or missing refund or accounts receivable documents’, 
‘increased customer complaints’, and ‘collection of written off accounts receivable 
without recording’. 
The study results were consistent with results from the ‘ACFE 2010 Report to the 
Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse’, and ‘KPMG 2006, 2007 Fraud Survey’ where 
tips from customers were found the most commonly cited method for fraud detection. 
Thus, if external auditors paid more attention to tips from customers and encouraged 
management to implement a proper control system for handling such complaints, more 
skimming schemes might be detected. On the other hand, ‘decreasing payments on 
accounts receivable’ and ‘a discrepancy in cash totals from normal patterns’ were 
perceived as the least important red flags. This might be because decreasing payments on 
accounts receivable can be due to an ineffective credit policy inside the company or 
because clients are having financial problems that hinder them from paying their 
liabilities. Also, discrepancies in cash deposit totals may be due to the company’s 
increased use of cash in dealing with its transactions rather than fraud. 
In case of cash larceny, results revealed that the most acceptable red flags were: 
‘stealing the amount of collected cash sales and recording an amount which is less than 
what was actually collected’, ‘the totals in bank deposit slip, the organisation’s copy of 
the deposit slip, the remittance list, and the general ledger posting of the day’s receipts 
did not match’, and ‘discrepancies between cash sales records in the company and cash 
on hand available in the company’s safes’. However, the least acceptable red flags were: 
‘deposits in transit that show up on bank reconciliation for more than two days’, and ‘the 
existence of customers’ cash invoices among credit invoices for customers’. 
As for billing schemes, which is the first type of fraudulent disbursements schemes, 
results showed that the most acceptable red flags for billing schemes were: ‘internal 
control deficiency’, ‘purchases that cannot be traced to inventory’, and ‘recording some 
fixed assets such as equipments and supplies twice where the first as fixed assets and the 
second as expenses’. The least acceptable red flags were: ‘the existence of a match 
between the employees address and the vendor’s address’, and ‘rapidly increasing 
purchases from one vendor’. This was consistent with results from the ACFE 2010 
Report, KPMG 2006, 2007 Fraud surveys, where deficiencies in internal control was 
cited as the most common reason for fraud. It was also consistent with Chapple et al. 
(2007) who found that the risk of asset misappropriation decrease with a strong system of 
internal control. On the other hand, the most acceptable red flags for cheque tampering 
were: ‘the existence of a cheque that shows a signature from the wrong signer for the date 
of the disbursement’, ‘cheque issued to cash, and cheque that do not appear in the vendor 
cheque register’, while the least acceptable red flags were: ‘the existence of any cancelled 
cheques with more than one endorsement or any non-payroll cheque that an employee 
has endorsed’, ‘the company does not keep all cancelled cheques’, and ‘lack of 
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supporting documents for actually receiving the cheques’. This was quite surprising as 
some of these red flags like ‘lack of supporting documents for actually receiving the 
cheques’ should arouse the auditors’ attention and should have been highlighted as one of 
the most important red flags for cheque tampering. However, this may be because 
cheques are not the most common method of payment in Egypt nowadays and external 
auditors might not be exposed enough to audit them. 
Regarding payroll schemes, the most acceptable red flags were: ‘recording fake 
amounts for employees’ transportation expense, expenses for employees’ stay, or wages 
for temporary employees and stealing those amounts’, ‘paying salaries to ghost 
employees who have any missing needed personal details’, and ‘the existence of 
temporary and changing employment inside the company’. However, the least acceptable 
red flags were: ‘significant budget overruns’, ‘the pay cheque summaries prepared for 
management approval having different type face from those printed by the system’, and 
‘payment of amounts to employees in excess of their stated salaries and wages included 
in the company’s payroll sheet’. 
As for the other two types of fraudulent disbursements schemes, the most acceptable 
red flags for expense reimbursement were: ‘receipts from a restaurant that are submitted 
over an extended period of time yet are consecutively numbered’, ‘supporting documents 
that do not look professional or lack any needed information about the vendor’, and 
‘using only copies of invoices and not original invoices when reimbursing expenses’. The 
least acceptable red flags were: ‘high usage of credit cards by a certain employee 
compared to his colleagues’, ‘reimbursement requests from an employee that consistently 
fall at or just below the organisation’s reimbursement limit’, and ‘expenses that are 
rounded off, ending with a 0 or 5 indicating that the value was fabricated’. 
In case of register disbursements schemes, the most acceptable red flags were: 
‘missing or forged void or refund document’, ‘cashier’s ability to issue refunds without 
supervision’, and ‘the existence of some of the company’s branches with high 
adjustments’. However, the least acceptable red flags were: ‘increased void or refund 
transactions by individual employees’, and ‘customer sales posted to one card and 
refunds posted to another card’. 
To sum up, respondents did not perceive red flags across and within each category 
equally important and Table 4 shows these red flags ranked according to their relative 
importance in an ascending order, where the most important red flag was mentioned first 
and given the number ‘1’, the second important red flag was given the number ‘2’, and so 
on. 
5.1.3 3rd research question 
In order to answer the third research question (How might external auditors in Egypt 
respond to risk factors arising from asset misappropriation?), an interview was conducted 
with 20 external auditors (eight audit seniors and 12 audit managers) working in an 
international audit office in Egypt. Each respondent was asked to state the possible audit 
procedure(s) he/she might in response to the list of red flags of asset misappropriation 
that was provided to them in the interview. Their responses were then analysed manually 
and refined by omitting repeated audit procedures so that for each red flag there will be 
one or more possible audit procedure. 
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Table 4 Ranked red flags of asset misappropriation 
Red flag for skimming schemes 
1 Personal cheques included in cash funds (swapping cheques for cash) 
2 Unusual journal entries or reconciling items 
3 Cash deposits totals differing from normal or expected patterns, or missing deposit slips, 
sales invoices or increased use of petty cash fund. 
4 Cash sales or receipts differing from deposits on bank statements. 
5 Forged, missing or altered refund documents 
6 Flat or declining revenue, Ratio of cash sales to credit sales or to total sales decreasing. 
7 Currency or cheque detail on summary sheets did not reconcile to the deposit ticket. 
8 Similarities between the customers’ addresses, ID numbers, or tax numbers and those of 
employees especially those working in the accounts receivable department 
9 High levels of discounts, adjustments, returns, and write offs. 
10 A significant rise in the number or size of overdue accounts could be a result of an 
employee who steals customer payments without ever posting them, thus causing the 
accounts to be past due. 
11 Customers with no telephone numbers or tax ID number may have been created for use in 
posting improper entries to hide a skimming scheme. 
Red flags for cash larceny 
1 All journal entries in cash accounts that appear to be unique adjustments. 
2 Any instance in which a deposit in transit exceeds the two day clear 
3 The totals in bank deposit slip, the organisation’s copy of the deposit slip, the remittance 
list, and the general ledger posting of the day’s receipts did not match. 
4 Discrepancies between sales records and cash on hand. Large differences will normally 
draw attention but also be alert to a high frequency of small dollar occurrences because 
fraudsters sometimes steal small amounts in the hopes that they will not be noticed or that 
they will be too small to review. 
5 If sales records have been destroyed, this could be a sign of larceny schemes. 
Red flags for billing schemes 
1 Rapidly increasing purchases from one vendor or vendor billing more than one month. 
2 Large billings broken into multiple smaller invoices, each of which is for an amount that 
will not attract attention. 
3 Internal control deficiency such as allowing a person who processes payments to approve 
new vendors. 
4 Vendors with company names consisting only of initials can be a sign of fraud because in 
most fraud cases fraudsters use their first name initials to form a shell company. 
5 The existence of unfamiliar vendors. 
6 If there is a match between employee addresses and vendor addresses. 
7 Significant increases in average unit price of goods purchased could signal pass-through 
schemes. 
8 Purchases that cannot be traced to inventory. 
9 Unexplained increases in the quantity of goods purchased. 
10 Billing schemes will also tend to cause an increase in cost of goods sold relative to sales 
and will tend to negatively impact profits. 
11 Billing causes an increase in expenses from previous years. 
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Table 4 Ranked red flags of asset misappropriation (continued) 
Red flags for billing schemes 
12 Billing schemes will cause an organisation’s expenses to exceed budget projections. 
13 Repeatedly billing for the same or similar amounts and if the perpetrator has purchase 
authority, these amounts will tend to be just below the perpetrator’s approval limit. 
14 The mailing address on an invoice if it is a mail drop or a residential address, it may 
indicate the existence of a shell company scheme. 
15 An invoice that lacks detailed descriptions of the items for which the victim organisation is 
being billed. 
Red flags for cheque tampering 
1 Cheques that are stolen will normally not appear in the vendor cheque register and thus 
will be seen as a gap in the cheques sequence. 
2 Cheques that are fabricated or stolen will many times not be in the same general sequence 
as the company’s normal cheques sequence. 
3 Cheques issued to cash have a higher incidence of fraud. 
4 Any cancelled cheques with more than one endorsement should be investigated, as should 
any non-payroll cheque that an employee has endorsed. That is because; to convert an 
intercepted cheque the perpetrator may have to use a dual endorsement. 
5 In case of rotating the authorisation duty, if a cancelled cheques shows a signature from 
the wrong signer for the date of the disbursement, this could indicate fraud. 
Red flags for payroll schemes 
1 The pay cheque summaries prepared for management approval can have different type 
face from those the system printed 
2 The net payroll expense was lower than the funds actually issued because it did not 
include amounts paid to ghost employees. 
3 Significant budget overruns could signal payroll fraud. 
4 Ghost employees who have no physical address or phone number or who have the same 
social security number and bank account number on their files can be a red flag for fraud 
existence 
Red flags for expense reimbursement schemes 
1 High usage of credit cards by certain employees may be a sign of abuse. 
2 Using credit cards for low dollar amount expenses while using cash in higher dollar 
expenses 
3 Employees claiming items that were paid for in cash. Claiming an expense was paid in 
cash allows the fraudster to explain why there is no audit trail for the expense. 
4 Receipts or other support that do not looks professional or lack information about the 
vendor such as phone numbers, physical addresses, or logos. 
5 Receipts from a restaurant that are submitted over an extended period of time, yet are 
consecutively numbered. This tends to indicate that the employee has obtained a stack of 
blank receipts and is using them to support fictitious expenses 
6 Reimbursement requests from an employee that consistently fall at or just below the 
organisation’s reimbursement limit. 
7 Patterns in which expenses are consistently for the same amount. For instance, a 
salesperson’s business dinners always cost $120. 
8 Expenses that are consistently rounded off, ending with a 0 or a 5 which tends to indicate 
that the employee is fabricating the numbers. 
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Table 4 Ranked red flags of asset misappropriation (continued) 
Red flags for register disbursement schemes 
1 Missing or forged void or refund document 
2 Cashier’s ability to issue refund without supervision 
3 The existence of some company’s branches with high adjustments 
4 Increased void or refund transactions by individual employees 
5 Customer sales posted to one card and refunds posted to another card 
Results from the interview revealed that external auditors in Egypt suggested the use of 
analytical procedures, review of reconciling items, inquiries of management, employees, 
and vendors, examination of ledgers and journal entries, surprise audit visits, physical 
count, confirmation, documentation, and re-performance in response to red flags arising 
from asset misappropriation. It was also noticed that most interviewees suggested the 
extensive use of analytical procedures, including comparisons, simple analysis (summary 
reports), trend analysis, and horizontal analysis, in case of skimming schemes, billing 
schemes, payroll schemes, expense reimbursement schemes, and register disbursement 
schemes. For instance, in skimming schemes five interviewees suggested the auditor 
compare total receipts with results of daily physical count and daily deposits with banks 
in case cash deposits totals differ from normal or expected patterns or in case of missing 
deposit slips, sales invoices or increased use of petty cash. Three interviewees suggested 
the auditor match the customer master file to the employee master file to spot similarities 
between customers’ details and employees’ details especially those working in the 
accounts receivable department. Automated systems like IDEA are more likely to help 
external auditors make this match in no time. One interviewee suggested the auditor run 
reports summarising the number of discounts, adjustments, and write offs generated by 
location, department, or employee to highlight high levels of discounts, adjustments, 
returns, and write offs. Again, automated systems can help external auditors to run these 
reports. In addition, six interviewees believed trend analysis on aging of customer 
accounts is the best procedure to highlight significant rises in the number or size of 
overdue accounts. In case of billing schemes, analytical procedures were extensively 
suggested too. For instance, three interviewees believed auditors should compare 
quantities in billings with those recorded in the warehouse addition slips in case there are 
large billings broken into multiple smaller invoices. Another interviewee suggested 
comparing current price lists with those of vendors and with price lists in previous years 
to highlight significant increases in average unit price of goods purchased. Four other 
interviewees also suggested the use of analytical procedures to ensure adequacy in the 
amounts of cost of goods sold and to review purchase levels. Only one interviewee 
suggested management’s inquiry in case an invoice lacks detailed descriptions of the 
items purchased. 
However, the use of analytical procedures was not suggested in case of cash larceny 
schemes and cheque tampering. Alternatively, interviewees suggested documentation and 
management’s inquiries in case of cash larceny. This might be because cash larceny is an 
on book scheme which means it is committed after recording transactions so it makes 
sense that examining documents could highlight any discrepancies or irregularities. For 
instance, one interviewee suggested auditor examines the general ledger details and all 
journal entries to cash accounts to highlight journal entries with unique adjustments. 
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Also, since the preparation of documents and financial statements is the responsibility of 
management, management’s inquiry was one of the most suggested procedures in case of 
cash larceny. This inquiry could alert auditors to management’s philosophy and operating 
style as well as the strength of management’s control system when it comes to 
preparation and custody of important documents. For instance, five interviewees 
suggested the use of management’s inquiry to know the reason behind a delay in deposits 
in transit, or in case of discrepancies between bank deposit slip and the general ledger of 
daily receipts, or in case of discrepancies between sales records and cash on hand. 
External auditors, as mentioned by Wells (2005), should also pay attention to small 
differences between sales records and cash on hand because fraudsters sometimes steal 
small amounts in the hopes that they will not be noticed or that they will be too small to 
review given external auditors normally pay attention to material amounts. 
Management’s inquiry was also suggested in case sales records have been destroyed as 
this might be a sign of larceny. Two other interviewees suggested auditors should also 
advise management to reconstruct the records that have been destroyed to review the 
results of such transactions. Most interviewees agreed that management’s inquiries has to 
be supported by documents as a kind of proof given management’s inquiries is a weak 
audit procedure and should not be counted on alone. 
As for cheque tampering, documentation and physical examination were the only 
suggested audit procedures by all interviewees. For instance, three interviewees 
suggested auditor examine the vendor cheques’ register to search for gaps in the cheque 
sequence which might be a sign of stolen cheques or to spot cheques issued to cash which 
might be a sign for high incidence of cheque tampering fraud. Two interviewees 
suggested auditor investigate the reasons behind the dual endorsement. This can be 
through management’s inquiry, or checking the company policy. Five interviewees saw 
reviewing supporting documents for cancelled cheques can be a way for checking proper 
authorisation on cancelled cheques. 
In case of payroll schemes, six interviewees suggested the use physical examination 
of payroll data files and human resource documents to cheques the legality of employees’ 
information. Two other interviewees suggested the use of re-performance and 
recalculation to ensure net pay agree with company records. While three interviewees 
suggested the use of analytical procedures, specifically trend analysis to spot significant 
budget overruns. As for expense reimbursement schemes, interviewees suggested a group 
of procedures including the use of credit summary reports that show and sort the usage of 
credit cards by employees, analysis of the type and nature of expenses to examine credit 
cards usages, checking the legality of receipts by visiting vendor’s premises, or reviewing 
the company’s reimbursement policy to ensure the legality of reimbursed expenses. One 
interviewee also mentioned that the use of companies’ credit cards to cover travel 
expenses is not common in Egypt. The use of analytical procedures appeared to be useful 
also in case of false voids and refunds. Interviewees suggested examining sales system 
register and summarising refunds and voids by location can easily spot false voids and 
refunds. Another interviewee added that examining the sales system register can also help 
auditors check whether a customer sales posted to one card and refunds was posted to 
another as this is a signal for false voids and refunds. Other audit procedures suggested 
by the interviewees are summarised in Table 5 which explains the proposed framework 
for detecting asset misappropriation. 
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6 Proposed framework for detecting asset misappropriation 
The current study sought to provide auditors with knowledge about asset 
misappropriation which has rarely been investigated in prior literature. It also sought to 
provide external auditors with a framework that might help them detect material 
misstatements arising from asset misappropriation. This framework was developed in 
three stages. The first stage was an initial list of 70 red flags associated with each 
category of asset misappropriation. This was derived from Wells (2005) text book about 
fraud examination which covers a wide variety of fraud cases occurring in the USA and 
in many other countries, as well as, examples of red flags of asset misappropriation 
provided by ISA No. 240 and SAS No. 99. This list was then refined by 15 external audit 
managers working in an international audit office in Egypt. This yields a list of 52 red 
flags of asset misappropriation which was later used as a base for the questionnaire in the 
second stage of the framework development. 
The second stage necessitates ranking the refined list of red flags from stage one 
according to their relative importance based on the perceptions of 93 external auditors in 
Egypt having proper audit experience. This stage answers the first two research questions 
(whether red flags are effective in detecting asset misappropriation and whether they have 
the same importance across and within asset misappropriation categories). Thus, this part 
fill an important gap in prior literature and address a limitation in fraud audit professional 
standards which is showing the rank or the relative importance of red flags associated 
with a type of fraud that has rarely been investigated in prior literature. The third step 
focus on audit procedures or the likely responses of external auditors to the heightened 
red flags of asset misappropriation. This also addresses another gap in the literature as 
well as a limitation in the current fraud audit professional standards (providing little 
guidance to external auditors on how to respond to heightened fraud risk factors). To 
develop this part of the framework, the current study interviewed eight audit seniors and 
12 audit managers in one of the international audit offices in Egypt. The interviewees 
were asked about their likely responses to the red flags under each category of asset 
misappropriation. Their responses were then analysed and merged to the list of ranked 
red flags to develop the framework as shown in Table 5. 
Thus, the framework includes a definition of each category of asset misappropriation, 
red flags, and the likely response to heightened red flags as shown in Table 5. Although 
this framework was based on perceptions of external auditors in Egypt, it can still be used 
by external auditors in any other country because the list of red flags was derived from 
examples provided by fraud audit professional standards that are applied by different 
countries. In addition the list was based on Wells’ textbook which includes real fraud 
cases that took place in different countries. However, this framework could later be 
applied and empirically tested to determine its applicability in different audit 
environments. 
7 Conclusions 
Fraud is a major concern for investors, regulators, and external auditors. Standards setters 
issued fraud audit standards to meet the public’s concerns and to expand external 
auditor’s responsibility for detecting two types of fraud, asset misappropriation and 
fraudulent financial reporting. However, standards setters’ efforts did not succeed in 
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meeting the public’s expectations because it provided little guidance to external auditors 
as to how to respond to fraud risk factors and did not assign weights for red flags. This 
might lead to an inefficient and ineffective fraud risk assessment and fraud risk response. 
Reviewing the literature also showed very few research studies into asset 
misappropriation. However, none of them mentioned how asset misappropriation could 
be detected by external auditors. Hence, to address this gap, the current study focuses on 
asset misappropriation, provides insights into a type of fraud that has had little 
examination in prior literature, and develops a framework that might help external 
auditors properly assess and respond to risk factors arising from asset misappropriation. 
This framework consists of a ranked list of red flags for each category of asset 
misappropriation along with the likely audit procedures or response to each of these red 
flags. Thus, the current study contributes to both literature and practice by providing 
knowledge about a type of fraud that has seldom been investigated in prior literature and 
by developing a framework that might help external auditors in detecting material 
misstatements arising from asset misappropriation while addressing two limitations in 
professional fraud audit standards (giving weights to red flags and providing guidance to 
external auditors on how to respond to these red flags). This will in turn reduce the audit 
expectation gap and raise the profile of the audit profession as well as reduce the 
probability of audit firms’ legal liability for negligence in detecting material 
misstatements due to fraud. 
The proposed framework in the current study also shows that analytical procedures 
were perceived to be useful in detecting all categories of asset misappropriation except 
for cash larceny and cheque tampering which respondents suggested might be detected 
using management’s inquires supported by documentation. Other procedures that was 
suggested by interviewees as a response for red flags of asset misappropriation include 
physical examination, review of reconciliations, confirmation, examination and review of 
supporting documents, journal entries, and ledgers, re-performance and recalculation, and 
conducting surprise audit visits to vendors’ and clients’ premises. Results from the 
questionnaire also revealed that external auditors in Egypt view red flags as an effective 
tool in detecting material misstatements arising from asset misappropriation. However, 
they did not perceive all red flags of the different categories of asset misappropriation 
equally important. For example, results from the current study showed that one of the 
most important red flags for skimming scheme as perceived by respondents is increased 
customer complaints which is consistent with results from the ‘ACFE 2010 Report to the 
Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse’, and ‘KPMG 2006, 2007 Fraud Survey’ where 
tips from customers were found the most commonly cited method for fraud detection. 
Thus, if external auditors paid more attention to tips from customers and encouraged 
management to implement a proper control system for handling such complaints, more 
fraud would be detected. Results also showed that among the most acceptable red flags 
for billing schemes was ‘internal control deficiency which is also consistent with results 
from the ACFE 2010 Report, KPMG 2006, 2007 Fraud surveys, where deficiencies in 
internal control was cited as the most common reason for fraud. This was also consistent 
with Chapple et al. (2007) who found less incidence of asset misappropriation when there 
is a strong internal control or corporate governance. However, the current study’s results 
was inconsistent with results from Gullkvist and Jokipii (2012) where external auditors 
had equal perceptions of the importance of red flags for each sub-category of asset 
misappropriation. 
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Like any other study, the current research has limitations. One of its limitations is that 
only two respondents in the study worked for the Big 4 international audit firms while 
most of our sample was from local and international firms. Hence, the results cannot be 
generalised to all external auditors in Egypt. However, this was due to the difficulty in 
accessing Big 4 audit firms in Egypt. Another limitation is the use of basic statistical 
analysis rather than models and sophisticated statistical techniques. The proposed 
framework was also based on perceptions of external auditors in Egypt and was not 
empirically tested. However, this was the first attempt in the literature to design a tool 
that might help external auditors in detecting material misstatements arising from asset 
misappropriation. Thus, future research should try to empirically test the framework 
developed in this study to determine how effective it is in helping external auditors detect 
material misstatements due to asset misappropriation in different audit environments. 
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Appendix 
A1 Analysis of the results 
Median for red flags associated with skimming schemes 
 Frequency Percent 
No 40 43% 
Yes 53 57% 
Total 93 93% 
Median for red flags for cash larceny schemes 
 Frequency Percentage 
No 35 37.60% 
Yes 58 62.40% 
Total 93 100% 
Median for red flags associated with billing schemes 
 Frequency Percent 
No 40 43% 
Yes 53 57% 
Total 93 100 
Median for red flags associated with cheque tampering 
 Frequency Percent 
No 28 30.1 
Yes 65 69.90% 
Total 93 100 
Median for red flags associated with payroll schemes. 
 Frequency Percent 
Yes 62 66.7% 
No 31 33.3 
Total 93 100 
Median for red flags associated with expense reimbursement 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 50 53.8 
No 43 46.2 
Total 93 100 
Median for red flags associated with register disbursement scheme 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 57 61.30% 
No 36 38.7 
Total 93 100 
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Respondents’ years of experience and red flags for skimming schemes 
 (0–2) (3–5) (6–10) More than 10 years Total 
No 13 (14.7%) 14 (15.9%) 6 6 40 
   –6.8 –15.40% –44.30% 
Yes 13 17 7 12 53 
 –33.30% –34.70% –14.30% –24.50% –55.70% 
Total 26 31 13 18 93 
 –29.50% –35.20% -14.80% –20.50% –100% 
Chi square test for red flags for skimming 
Type of fraud Value of chi square Significance 
Skimming 1.247 0.742 
Respondents’ years of experience and red flags for cash larceny 
 2 years or less 5 years or less 10 years or less More than 10 years 
No 11 12 5 7 
 31.40% 34.30% 14.30% 20% 
Yes 15 19 8 11 
 28.30% 35.80% 15.10% 20.80% 
Total 26 31 13 18 
 29.50% 35.20% 14.80% 20.50% 
Chi square test for red flags for cash larceny 
Type of fraud Pearson chi square Contingency coefficient Significance value 
Cash larceny 100 34 0.992 




2 years of 
experience or less 
5 years of 
experience or less 
10 years of 
experience 
More than 10 years 
of experience 
No 14 17 5 8 
 31.80% 38.60% 11.40% 18.20% 
Yes 12 14 8 10 
 27.30% 31.80% 18.20% 22.70% 
Total 26 31 13 18 
 29.50% 35.20% 14.80% 20.50% 
Chi square test for red flags for fraudulent disbursements schemes 
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Type of audit office and red flags for skimming 
Skimming schemes The big 4 international audit firms Local audit offices Total 
No 1 3 40 
 1.10% 3.20%  
Yes 1 13 53 
 1.10% 14%  
Total 2 16 93 
 2.20% 17.20%  
Type of audit office and red flags for skimming 
Type of fraud Pearson chi square Significance value 
Skimming 4.644 0.098 
Type of office and red flags for cash larceny 
Cash larceny The big 4 international audit firms 
International audit firms 
other than the big 4 
Local audit 
offices Total 
No 1 32 2 35 
 1.10% 34.40% 2.20%  
Yes 1 43 14 58 
 1.10% 74.10% 15.10%  
Total 2 (2.2%) 75 (80.6%) 16 (17.2%) 93 
Chi square for red flags for cash larceny 
Type of fraud Pearson chi square Contingency coefficient Significance value 
Cash larceny 5.246 0.231 0.073 
Type of audit office and red flags for fraudulent disbursements 
Red flags for fraudulent 
disbursement schemes 




firms other than the big 
4 audit firms 
Local audit 
firms Total 
No 1 41 3 45 
 1.10% 44.10% 3.20%  
Yes 1 34 13 48 
 1.10% 36.60% 14%  
Total 2 75 16 93 
 2.20% 80.60% 17.20%  
Chi square test for red flags for fraudulent disbursement 




6.817 0.261 0.033 
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The current research is seeking to help external auditors in Egypt detect material 
misstatements arising from asset misappropriation which was seldom covered in prior 
literature. This issue has also never been investigated in the Egyptian context before, thus 
your kind participation will be greatly appreciated. Kindly be informed that data collected 
by the current study will only be used for research purposes and will not be revealed to 
any other party whatsoever without your prior approval. I am also assuring the anonymity 
of your responses and the confidentiality of your personal details. 
The questionnaire includes three sections where each section aims to answer a specific 
research question. The first section is seeking your perception on whether red flags are 
effective in detecting asset misappropriation. In this section a list of red flags is provided 
and you are kindly required to state whether you agree or disagree that each red flag will 
be effective in detecting a category of asset misappropriation. Please let me know if 
something is not clear or requires further clarification. In the second section, you are 
kindly required to rank each of the red flags according to their relative importance in 
detecting asset misappropriation based on your audit experience and knowledge of fraud. 
The third section, however, includes some demographic information about your kind 
selves for data analysis purposes. 
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Section 1 
This section is seeking your perception on whether red flags are effective in detecting 
asset misappropriation. A list of red flags is provided below and you are kindly required 
to state whether you agree or disagree that each red flag will be effective in detecting a 
category of asset misappropriation. Please denote your choice by putting (x). 
Q1 Do you agree that each of the following red flags is effective in detecting 
asset misappropriation 
Red flag for skimming schemes Yes No 
High levels of discounts, adjustments, returns, and write offs.   
Similarities between the customers’ addresses, ID numbers, or tax numbers and 
those of employees especially those working in the accounts receivable department 
  
Currency or cheque detail on summary sheets did not reconcile to the deposit 
ticket. 
  
Flat or declining revenue, Ratio of cash sales to credit sales or to total sales 
decreasing. 
  
Forged, missing or altered refund documents   
Cash sales or receipts differing from deposits on bank statements.   
Cash deposits totals differing from normal or expected patterns, or Missing deposit 
slips, sales invoices or increased use of petty cash fund. 
  
Unusual journal entries or reconciling items   
Customers with no telephone numbers or tax ID number may have been created 
for use in posting improper entries to hide a skimming scheme. 
  
A significant rise in the number or size of overdue accounts could be a result of an 
employee who steals customer payments without ever posting them, thus causing 
the accounts to be past due. 
  
Personal cheques included in cash funds (swapping cheques for cash)   
Red flags for cash larceny   
If sales records have been destroyed, this could be a sign of larceny schemes.   
Discrepancies between sales records and cash on hand. Large differences will 
normally draw attention but also be alert to a high frequency of small dollar 
occurrences because fraudsters sometimes steal small amounts in the hopes that 
they will not be noticed or that they will be too small to review. 
  
The totals in bank deposit slip, the organisation’s copy of the deposit slip, the 
remittance list, and the general ledger posting of the day’s receipts did not match. 
  
Any instance in which a deposit in transit exceeds the two day clear   
All journal entries in cash accounts that appear to be unique adjustments.   
Red flags for billing schemes   
Unexplained increases in the quantity of goods purchased.   
Purchases that cannot be traced to inventory.   
Significant increases in average unit price of goods purchased could signal pass-
through schemes. 
  
If there is a match between employee addresses and vendor addresses.   
The existence of unfamiliar vendors.   
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Vendors with company names consisting only of initials can be a sign of fraud 
because in most fraud cases fraudsters use their first name initials to form a shell 
company. 
  
Internal control deficiency such as allowing a person who processes payments to 
approve new vendors. 
  
Large billings broken into multiple smaller invoices, each of which is for an 
amount that will not attract attention. 
  
The mailing address on an invoice if it is a mail drop or a residential address, it 
may indicate the existence of a shell company scheme. 
  
Repeatedly billing for the same or similar amounts and if the perpetrator has 
purchase authority, these amounts will tend to be just below the perpetrator’s 
approval limit. 
  
An invoice that lacks detailed descriptions of the items for which the victim 
organisation is being billed. 
  
Billing schemes will cause an organisation’s expenses to exceed budget 
projections. 
  
Billing causes an increase in expenses from previous years.   
Billing schemes will also tend to cause an increase in cost of goods sold relative to 
sales and will tend to negatively impact profits. 
  
Rapidly increasing purchases from one vendor or vendor billing more than one 
month. 
  
Red flags for cheque tampering   
Any cancelled cheques with more than one endorsement should be investigated, as 
should any non-payroll cheques that an employee has endorsed. That is because to 
convert an intercepted cheque the perpetrator may have to use a dual endorsement. 
  
Cheques issued to cash have a higher incidence of fraud.   
Cheques that are fabricated or stolen will many times not be in the same general 
sequence as the company’s normal cheque sequence. 
  
Cheques that are stolen will normally not appear in the vendor cheques’ register 
and thus will be seen as a gap in the cheque sequence. 
  
In case of rotating the authorisation duty, if cancelled cheques shows a signature 
from the wrong signer for the date of the disbursement, this could indicate fraud. 
  
Red flags for payroll schemes   
Ghost employees who have no physical address or phone number or who have the 
same social security number and bank account number on their files can be a red 
flag for fraud existence 
  
Significant budget overruns could signal payroll fraud.   
The net payroll expense was lower than the funds actually issued because it did not 
include amounts paid to ghost employees. 
  
The pay cheque summaries prepared for management approval can have different 
type face from those the system printed 
  
Red flags for expense reimbursement schemes   
Receipts from a restaurant that are submitted over an extended period of time, yet 
are consecutively numbered. This tends to indicate that the employee has obtained 
a stack of blank receipts and is using them to support fictitious expenses 
  
Receipts or other support that do not looks professional or lack information about 
the vendor such as phone numbers, physical addresses, or logos. 
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Employees claiming items that were paid for in cash. Claiming an expense was 
paid in cash allows the fraudster to explain why there is no audit trail for the 
expense. 
  
Using credit cards for low dollar amount expenses while using cash in higher 
dollar expenses 
  
High usage of credit cards by certain employees may be a sign of abuse.   
Expenses that are consistently rounded off, ending with a 0 or a 5 which tends to 
indicate that the employee is fabricating the numbers. 
  
Patterns in which expenses are consistently for the same amount. For instance; a 
salesperson’s business dinners always cost $120. 
  
Reimbursement requests from an employee that consistently fall at or just below 
the organisation’s reimbursement limit. 
  
Red flags for register disbursement schemes   
Missing or forged void or refund document   
Cashier’s ability to issue refund without supervision   
The existence of some company’s branches with high adjustments   
Increased void or refund transactions by individual employees   
Customer sales posted to one card and refunds posted to another card   
Section 2 
In this section, you are kindly required to rank each of the red flags according to their 
relative importance in detecting asset misappropriation based on your audit experience 
and knowledge of fraud using 5 Likert scale, where ‘1’ denotes most important, and ‘5’ 
denotes least important. 
Q Do red flags have equal importance within asset misappropriation 
categories? 
Red flag for skimming schemes 1 2 3 4 5 
High levels of discounts, adjustments, returns, and write offs.      
Similarities between the customers’ addresses, ID numbers, or tax 
numbers and those of employees especially those working in the 
accounts receivable department 
     
Currency or cheques detail on summary sheets did not reconcile to the 
deposit ticket. 
     
Flat or declining revenue, ratio of cash sales to credit sales or to total 
sales decreasing. 
     
Forged, missing or altered refund documents      
Cash sales or receipts differing from deposits on bank statements.      
Cash deposits totals differing from normal or expected patterns, or 
Missing deposit slips, sales invoices or increased use of petty cash fund. 
     
Unusual journal entries or reconciling items      
Customers with no telephone numbers or tax ID number may have been 
created for use in posting improper entries to hide a skimming scheme. 
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A significant rise in the number or size of overdue accounts could be a 
result of an employee who steals customer payments without ever 
posting them, thus causing the accounts to be past due. 
     
Personal cheques included in cash funds (swapping cheques for cash)      
Red flags for cash larceny      
If sales records have been destroyed, this could be a sign of larceny 
schemes. 
     
Discrepancies between sales records and cash on hand. Large 
differences will normally draw attention but also be alert to a high 
frequency of small dollar occurrences because fraudsters sometimes 
steal small amounts in the hopes that they will not be noticed or that 
they will be too small to review. 
     
The totals in bank deposit slip, the organisation’s copy of the deposit 
slip, the remittance list, and the general ledger posting of the day’s 
receipts did not match. 
     
Any instance in which a deposit in transit exceeds the two day clear      
All journal entries in cash accounts that appear to be unique 
adjustments. 
     
Red flags for billing schemes      
Unexplained increases in the quantity of goods purchased.      
Purchases that cannot be traced to inventory.      
Significant increases in average unit price of goods purchased could 
signal pass-through schemes. 
     
If there is a match between employee addresses and vendor addresses.      
The existence of unfamiliar vendors.      
Vendors with company names consisting only of initials can be a sign 
of fraud because in most fraud cases fraudsters use their first name 
initials to form a shell company. 
     
Internal control deficiency such as allowing a person who processes 
payments to approve new vendors. 
     
Large billings broken into multiple smaller invoices, each of which is 
for an amount that will not attract attention. 
     
The mailing address on an invoice if it is a mail drop or a residential 
address, it may indicate the existence of a shell company scheme. 
     
Repeatedly billing for the same or similar amounts and if the perpetrator 
has purchase authority, these amounts will tend to be just below the 
perpetrator’s approval limit. 
     
An invoice that lacks detailed descriptions of the items for which the 
victim organisation is being billed. 
     
Billing schemes will cause an organisation’s expenses to exceed budget 
projections. 
     
Billing causes an increase in expenses from previous years.      
Billing schemes will also tend to cause an increase in cost of goods sold 
relative to sales and will tend to negatively impact profits. 
     
Rapidly increasing purchases from one vendor or vendor billing more 
than one month. 
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Red flags for cheque tampering      
Any cancelled cheques with more than one endorsement should be 
investigated, as should any non-payroll cheques that an employee has 
endorsed. That is because to convert an intercepted cheques the 
perpetrator may have to use a dual endorsement. 
     
Cheques issued to cash have a higher incidence of fraud.      
Cheques that are fabricated or stolen will many times not be in the same 
general sequence as the company’s normal cheque sequence. 
     
Cheques that are stolen will normally not appear in the vendor cheques’ 
register and thus will be seen as a gap in the cheque sequence. 
     
In case of rotating the authorisation duty, if cancelled cheques shows a 
signature from the wrong signer for the date of the disbursement, this 
could indicate fraud. 
     
Red flags for payroll schemes      
Ghost employees who have no physical address or phone number or 
who have the same social security number and bank account number on 
their files can be a red flag for fraud existence 
     
Significant budget overruns could signal payroll fraud.      
The net payroll expense was lower than the funds actually issued 
because it did not include amounts paid to ghost employees. 
     
The pay cheque summaries prepared for management approval can have 
different type face from those the system printed 
     
Red flags for expense reimbursement schemes      
Receipts from a restaurant that are submitted over an extended period of 
time, yet are consecutively numbered. This tends to indicate that the 
employee has obtained a stack of blank receipts and is using them to 
support fictitious expenses 
     
Receipts or other support that do not looks professional or lack 
information about the vendor such as phone numbers, physical 
addresses, or logos. 
     
Employees claiming items that were paid for in cash. Claiming an 
expense was paid in cash allows the fraudster to explain why there is no 
audit trail for the expense. 
     
Using credit cards for low dollar amount expenses while using cash in 
higher dollar expenses 
     
High usage of credit cards by certain employees may be a sign of abuse.      
Expenses that are consistently rounded off, ending with a 0 or a 5 which 
tends to indicate that the employee is fabricating the numbers. 
     
Patterns in which expenses are consistently for the same amount. For 
instance; a salesperson’s business dinners always cost $120. 
     
Reimbursement requests from an employee that consistently fall at or 
just below the organisation’s reimbursement limit. 
     
Red flags for register disbursement schemes      
Missing or forged void or refund document      
Cashier’s ability to issue refund without supervision      
The existence of some company’s branches with high adjustments      
Increased void or refund transactions by individual employees      
Customer sales posted to one card and refunds posted to another card      
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Section 3 
This section includes some demographic information about your kind self which is 
needed for data analysis purposes only. I assure you that your information will remain 
confidential and will only be used for the purpose of this study. 
How many years of audit experience you have? Please tick (x) in the right box 
 0–2 years  
 3–5 years  
 6–10 years  
 More than 10 years  
What is the type of your audit office? Please tick (x) in the right box 
 Local audit office  
 International audit office  
 Big 4 audit office  
Please note if you would accept to be interviewed later to cooperate more in this research. Please 
tick (x) in the right box 
 Yes I would like to be interviewed  
 No I do not like to be interviewed  
If you ticked ‘Yes’, please write your e-mail or mobile number: 
Thanks for your cooperation 
 
